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20 April 1967

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SPECIAL  
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

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SECURITY CONDITIONS IN THE  
BONN-COLOGNE AREA OF GERMANY

Submitted by

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf

20 April 1967

NOTE: This is the estimate. No further distribution will be made.

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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the NSA, the FBI, and the Secret Service.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 April 1967

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] SECURITY CONDITIONS IN THE BONN-COLOGNE  
AREA OF GERMANY

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CONCLUSION

The personal risk to President Johnson during this trip will be minimal. German security preparations should be adequate to forestall acts of violence which might endanger the President or any other prominent member of the funeral cortege. The solemnity of the occasion reduces the likelihood of even minor demonstrations like those which met Vice President Humphrey on his recent European trip, but we cannot exclude the possibility of some political agitation (e.g., placard-waving or chanting) against the President by leftist students or others opposed to US policy in Vietnam.

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DISCUSSION

1. The security forces normally entrusted with the protection of dignitaries in the Federal Republic and the special forces which will be called in during the funeral of former Chancellor Adenauer will be adequate to deal with possible threats to the President or other prominent participants in the ceremonies. There is no problem of political instability in West Germany, and concern for public order, both on the part of the authorities and the population in general, has always been high.

2. During Vice President Humphrey's recent European trip, there were no demonstrations in the Bonn-Cologne area. Small demonstrations against US policy in Vietnam, which included plots involving home-made explosives by a handful of leftist youths, did occur in West Berlin. (The plan apparently was to embarrass, but not injure, the Vice President with these explosives.) It is conceivable that certain groups could attempt similar protests during the President's visit. The organizations most likely to be involved would be the Federation of German Socialist Students (SDS), a small radical leftist group;

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the Communist-front German Peace Union (DFU); and the Easter Marchers, an assorted collection of antiwar protesters which usually includes supporters of the SDS and the DFU. The demonstrations sponsored by these groups have never exceeded the capacity of the German security forces to cope with them, and are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.

3. The nature of the occasion will also dampen the enthusiasm of potential demonstrators. The respect for ceremonial mourning is so high in Germany that political protests during a state funeral would be widely condemned by the public at large. On the whole, we think any demonstrations are highly unlikely, and if any occur they will almost certainly be mild and nonviolent.

4. Coordination of plans for the protection of guests at the funeral will be in the hands of the Security Group of the Federal Criminal Police, and a large number of security forces will be committed to the task. Additional protection will be provided by local police forces in the Bonn-Cologne area, and elements of the armed forces will also probably be called in for police duty.

- 3 -

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5. In view of the recent visit by Vice President Humphrey, the German security authorities have an up-to-date compilation of known crackpots who might possibly endanger a visiting US leader. We are confident that the authorities will carefully review this information and that their preparations to nullify identifiable risks of this sort will be thorough. German security officials will have a somewhat more difficult problem in protecting many foreign leaders than they would if only the US President were visiting. For example, they must watch the activities of individuals in Germany who might be hostile to de Gaulle, or of exiles who might wish to injure possible Moroccan, Iranian, or other representatives. (There are substantial numbers of Moroccan and Iranian students in the Bonn-Cologne area who are antagonistic to their own governments.) We believe, however, that the German authorities will be fully competent to the task.

- 4 -

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